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This paper critically revisits the debate on natural resource rent, curse and conflict, 
interrogating some of the key assumptions that have become received knowledge in extant 
discourses. The paper demonstrates how orthodox theories’ preoccupation with issues of 
resource rent and resource curse tend to be marred by slants of ahistoricity and state-
centricity. Adopting a stakeholder approach to the issues of resource rent and conflict in 
Africa, the author argues that natural resource rents produce and attract a multiplicity of 
competitive stakeholders, both domestic and external, in the resource-rich states. The 
competition and jostling of stakeholders for access to, and appropriation of rentier 
resources is too often an antagonistic process in many emerging economies that have 
consequences and implications for violent conflict. The paper attempts a new conceptual 
explanation of how natural resource rents dialectically generate stakes, stakeholders and 
political conflict. The paper concludes by proposing the need for the more conflict-prone 
African rentier states to transition to a more functional state model, the transformative 
state. 
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Revisiting the resource curse debate 
Many experts have extensively studied the links between abundant natural resource wealth in 
developing countries and violent conflicts such as rebel insurgency, secessionism, and civil war. A 
number of conflicting conclusions have been reached by academic and policy specialists. Resource 
curse theorists and sympathisers who have dominated the debate over the years have strongly linked 
the extraction of natural resources and abundant correlated wealth to prebendal corruption, 
authoritarianism, economic stagnation and ultimately armed conflicts (Karl, 1997; Dominik, 2013). In 
terms of definition, the idea of natural resource curse implies the structural prevalence of a macro-
economic paradox in the operation of a natural resource-rich state whereby the vast majority of its 
citizens are consigned to extreme poverty essentially inflicted by the systematic expropriation of the 
resource wealth by an unscrupulous governing elite oftentimes working in collaboration with both 
visible and underground local and international business partners. The deliberate and vicious inability 
of the state managers to make the surplus resource wealth of a country impact positively on the lives 
of the vast majority of their citizens is the flip side of the resource curse. In contemporary 
dispensation, resource curse tends to be mainly fostered by a nexus of institutional and legal 
weaknesses in the resource-rich states which aid the unscrupulous political leaders, public officials 
and their business associates to loot the affected fragile and captive economies.  
 
A survey of the institutional and legal environments in 58 resource-rich countries around the world 
found that only 11 manage their natural resource sectors effectively.5 These 58 countries represent 85 
percent of the world’s petroleum reserves and a significant share of global mineral wealth, including 
90 percent of diamond reserves and 80 percent of copper reserves. Of the 58 countries included in the 
survey, 20 are in Africa—more than any other region in the world. None of these African countries 
was deemed to manage their natural resource wealth satisfactorily (Mailey, 2015, p. 5). 
                                                          
*
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Placed in a historical context, the original hope in the 1950s and 1960s that the discovery of 
natural resources (notably oil and gas, but also including solid minerals) would enhance prosperity 
and economic growth in many developing countries was replaced by the gloomy realisation from the 
late 1970s that these resources have, for the most part, been a source of economic distress, 
underdevelopment and conflict. Some of the African countries often used as examples to highlight the 
tragedy of the natural resource curse include war-affected states like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, 
the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sudan; volatile conflict-prone countries like Nigeria, Cameroun and 
Chad, as well as hostage economies like Equatorial Guinea.  Human development indices and 
infrastructural conditions in all of these countries are characteristically poor.  As such, the vast 
majority of their citizens live on less than US$1.25 a day. Moreover, the economies of the seemingly 
resource-cursed states are lopsidedly structured around the production and export of one or a few 
natural resources (e.g. diamonds, oil and gas, timber, cobalt, etc) as opposed to being diversified 
across several productive manufacturing sectors, which many international political economy experts 
regard as a necessary condition for sustainable growth and development. 
Based on the analysis of empirical macro-economic data from different oil-rich developing 
countries, scholars and policy analysts have proffered a number of arguments to explain the reasons 
for the prevalence of resource curse in many oil-rich developing economies, otherwise known as 
rentier states. These arguments can be summarised as follows.  The first is that crude oil, like most 
natural resources, is excessively subject to the vagaries (boom and bust cycle) of the international 
commodity market (Lehrer, 2007; Frankel, 2010). Secondly, many rentier states have volatile and 
narrow revenue bases, and volatile ‘rent’ revenues are difficult to manage given the weak 
institutional, technical and regulatory capacities of the states (Collier, 2008). Prebendal corruption by 
the hegemonic rentier elite becomes rife, which ultimately undermines investment in social 
development. In order to ensure regime survival and accumulation, the governing elite invests 
continuously in strengthening the security and repressive apparatuses of the state, a tendency which 
makes abundant natural resource wealth to systematically promote repression and authoritarian rule. 
This heightens the proneness of the state to armed insurgency and civil war. Armed rebellion in 
resource-rich states, as some experts argue, could be further instigated or aggravated and prolonged 
by factional greed for lootable natural resources and criminal obstructibility of the largely non-
lootable resources (Collier & Hoefller, 2000; Ross, 2012). 
Thirdly, access to plenteous rents in the form of oil revenue, for instance, tends to correlate 
negatively with democracy by minimising government’s reliance on taxation of its citizens or 
completely freeing the state from the need to levy taxes, and the corresponding obligation of 
representative democracy believed to be an inherent principle in citizens’ taxation (Luciani, 1997). 
Public taxation, theorists argue, leads to citizens’ demand for democratic representation and 
accountability. Furthermore, in many petro-states with low income per capita (e.g. Nigeria, 
Cameroun, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville) attempts to introduce multi-party democracy are 
invariably scuttled by an incumbent hegemonic party that persistently manipulates the electoral 
process to remain in power, thereby leaving the state with a form of dysfunctional rentier democracy 
tempered with sporadic outbursts of violence from below and militarized repression from above 
(Bratton, 1998; Collier, 2008).  
Fourthly, it is argued that preponderant reliance on natural resources could produce the deleterious 
effect of crowding out manufacturing and other productive sectors of the economy, especially sectors 
that offer dynamic benefits and spillovers conducive to growth – a tendency broadly known as the 
‘Dutch Disease’ (Moyo, 2009; Frankel, 2010).  
Paradoxically, in his study of the effects of oil wealth and changes in oil prices on political 
stability between 1960 and 1999, Benjamin Smith (2004) posits that oil wealth is positively associated 
with greater regime durability, and significantly related to lower levels of anti-government protest and 
civil war in both democratic and authoritarian states. Smith argues from his findings that contrary to 
the thesis of a number of resource curse theorists, repression seem not to be the mechanism by which 
oil-rich rentier states of the Middle East and elsewhere maintain regime durability but by other 
positive investment factors that may relate to the dividends and blessings of oil wealth. John 
Heilbrunn (2014, pp. 9 & 16) amplifies the anti-resource curse discourse of Smith in a more recent 
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study of the African oil economies in which he argues that ‘oil revenues are hardly a curse; rather, 
they are an opportunity for poor countries to grow economically and create institutional conditions 
that are conducive to democracy and development.’  In his critique of Smith’s sceptical thesis on 
resource curse, Hlavac (2004, p. 3) remarks that ‘Smith’s models assume that regime durability, civil 
war and political protest are all a function of economic growth and oil dependency.’ ‘Causuality,’ 
argues Hlavac, could however, also run the other way: … ‘countries that suffer from conflict or 
instability may be less able to attract investment or develop industries in sectors other than natural 
resource extraction’ (Hlavac, 2004, p. 3). 
 
Ahistoricity and state-centricity 
The resource curse theory and the general debate on natural resource conflicts make interesting 
contributions to how the use of state power interfaces with the macro-economic conditions and 
concomitants of growth, boom, development, bust, poverty and turmoil in postcolonial states. 
However, as Magrin and Vliet (2009) argue, ‘various studies that defend the resource curse thesis are 
based on a confusion between correlation and causation, thereby drawing unwarranted conclusions 
concerning links between resources and conflicts.’ The problem with most explanations from the 
resource curse and related perspectives is essentially twofold. The first is their preponderantly 
ahistorical narrativism, often mystified with quantitative regression analysis and econometric 
modelling, on the conditions for natural resource curse and the correlated conflicts. Both the 
quantitative and qualitative explanations of proponents are almost always of short post-colonial span 
and devoid of relevant historical depth. It suffices to say that the issue of how natural resource curse 
and conflicts are produced in transitional extractive economies is mainly a structural one which has a 
profound historical rhythm that logically connects present performance failures to past structural 
foundations. The globalisation of production and trade in the late 19
th
 century in the aftermath of the 
industrial revolution in Western Europe was the key factor in the emergence of dependent extractive 
economies in Africa and other regions of the global South. A great deal of historical studies exists on 
how European colonial rule and imperial governance created outposts of dependencies in the global 
South for the primary purpose of exploiting economic resources (mostly minerals and agricultural 
produce) as a means to providing the crucial raw materials necessary to advance capitalist production 
and industrialisation in the metropolitan West. To consign a greater part of the global South to 
dependencies for extraction of vital natural resources during colonial rule, Western imperial powers 
supplanted the sovereignty of the peoples they colonized and instituted a regime of impunity 
conducive to unaccountable exploitation and accumulation. Forced labour, compulsory cash crop 
production and delegation of sovereign power to transnational trading companies and individuals 
were all part of the regime of impunity widespread in the colonies (Mbembe, 2001; Omeje, 2015). 
The colonisers equipped and supported many ‘transnational companies’ (TNCs) with commercial and 
mining privileges and with the sovereign rights allowing them to raise taxes and maintain an armed 
force (Mbembe, 2001). 
Colonialism was characterised by profuse obnoxious laws and gross abuse of law by colonial 
officials and agencies, including the big TNCs. From fiscal stewardship, legal justice and human 
rights perspectives, colonial agencies largely presided over a regime of impunity, hypocrisy and 
unaccountable rule.  Mbembe aptly observes that the tendency to usurp the powers of the state for 
self-accumulation purposes under colonial rule was a rampart phenomenon that tended to occur in 
various guises and everywhere in the colonial service and economy, which ironically was a radical 
departure from the common law, individual rights and principles of legal justice that were already 
emerging in the metropole (Mbembe, 2001). 
It is the foregoing political economy of natural resource extraction, with its anomalies of 
unaccountable political superstructure, compromised political culture and a strategic corporate mining 
sector imbued with vestiges of state figure, personality and mentality that most post-colonial states 
inherited at independence. As a matter of fact, many of the lead TNCs, some of which have 
metamorphosed into global business conglomerates under different operational names, continued to 
preponderantly retain their colonial privileges well into the post-independence dispensation and even 
in contemporary era. Under the prevailing circumstance, perpetuating the inherited culture of usurping 
state power for prebendal accumulation becomes a convenient political capital for the hegemonic 
post-colonial elites while taming and regulating the all-powerful TNCs becomes, for many states, a 
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strategic dilemma in which diverse options are contemplated and explored. Confrontation and 
collaboration, nationalisation and de-nationalisation, co-investment and production-sharing 
partnership, displacement and replacement of firms, to mention a few, are some of the strategic 
options that have been explored with mixed results by different post-colonial states. The role of the 
strategic mining sector, which in most African states is dominated by TNCs, cannot be divorced from 
any serious analysis of how natural resource curse and the correlated conflicts are produced in Africa. 
The second problem, the issue of state-centric explanations of natural resource curse and conflicts, 
is directly related to the preceding narrative. The dominant narrative in resource curse explanation is 
so much about the “harm” the state and its officials are doing and the “good” they are failing to do, 
which ultimately produces both the curse and armed conflict. The implicit assumption in this cyclical 
narrative is that if the state stops doing all the harm it is said to be doing, and starts doing all the good 
it is charged with failing to do, then the social maladies of resource curse and conflict would be 
automatically fixed. Whilst this explanation might be partially correct, it is fundamentally a half-truth 
over-simplification of the empirical reality. The key disconnect in all of these theoretical assumptions 
is the phenomenon of stakes and the critical role of various stakeholders. The institutional state in 
weak developing countries of Africa is only one among many competing stakeholders, albeit in many 
instances, the most decisive stakeholder. But this is by no means to understate the instrumental 
significance of other stakeholders, as well as the specific historical, international and circumstantial 
environment in which they all operate.  
One of the greatest tragedies of colonialism and colonial legacy in Africa is the fact that external 
metropolitan forces (states, TNCs, international NGOs, and other foreign supra-national actors) have 
historically acquired strategic stakes and become important stakeholders in African domestic and 
regional affairs in a disproportionately disadvantageous way that their African counterparts cannot 
and would not have the slightest opportunity to replicate in their foreign home turfs. A simple 
example (not directly related to the politics of rent) will help to further illustrate this point.  In 
February 2012 and May 2013, the UK government hosted a stakeholder conference in the famous 
Lancaster House in London on resolving the conflict in Somalia and turning around the Somali state. 
The 2013 conference which the UK government ‘co-hosted’ with the Somali government was 
convened ‘to provide international support for the Government of Somalia as they rebuild their 
country after two decades of conflict’ (UK Government FCO, 2013). The stakeholders in attendance 
in the more crucial 2013 conference co-hosted with the government of Somalia were 54 friends and 
partners of Somalia, including the African Union Peacekeeping Force in Somalia (AMISOM) and all 
the troop contributing countries, key regional organisations like AU and IGAD, European Union and 
leading EU governments, the World Bank, Organisation of Islamic Conference, Arab League and 
leading Arab Gulf states, UN, etc. Regarding the substantive issues discussed, ‘the conference overly 
concentrated on issues of security, justice, and public financial management – aspects that are 
conspicuously of concern to an international community that feels threatened by Somali [Islamist] 
extremism, worries about government corruption of donor funding, and prioritises a human rights 
agenda;’ in fact, the conference communique is oriented to particular outcomes to be delivered by the 
Somali government, which includes ‘a commitment to form a fully federal government and deliver 
democratic elections in 2016’ (UK Government FCO, 2013; Balthasar, 2013). Evaluating the ‘new 
deal’ delivered by the London conference on Somali, Balthasar (2013) remarks that:  
 
In view of the fact that the conference focused so narrowly on specific outcomes, the Somali 
government’s policy space was significantly restricted. Among others, this shows in the 
communiqué’s insistence on the establishment of a ‘fully federal government’ – a process that has 
largely been objected by the Somali government thus far, due to fears that federalism could weaken 
its own standing and prospects of state-making. However, the Somali government is now pressed to 
comply with a greater devolution of power to regional states, which is likely to complicate matters, 
not least as this leaves Somalia’s neighbours with continued influence to meddle in Somali politics. 
It seems quite normal in this post-colonial and post-Cold War era that a stakeholder conference to 
turnaround the conflict-ridden state of Somali should be repeatedly held in London with both the 
agenda and outcomes of the summit profoundly shaped by western stakeholders. It will be 
inconceivable that a stakeholder conference to turnaround the failed economy of Greece or to resolve 
the conflicts in Bosnia and Ukraine should be held in Lilongwe, the capital city of the Southern 
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African state of Malawi or in Pretoria, South Africa, let alone inviting any African agencies to such a 
summit as stakeholders. It doesn’t take more than a sophomore level course in international 
negotiation to know that where you host a problem-solving intervention summit, who sets the agenda; 
who attends the summit, their resource capability and what they bring to the table – can all have 
decisive influence in the outcome of the summit and possibly on the ultimate turn out of events on the 
ground. African states and agencies do not have the overall capacity to acquire important stakes in 
South/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and therefore cannot be stakeholders in the Bosnian, 
Ukrainian and Greek troubles in a similar way that UK, Italy, Germany, Turkey, US and the EU can 
be considered important stakeholders in the conflict in Somalia. This is a well-structured case of 
asymmetrical stakeholding in international relations and the origin of the phenomenon transcends 
post-colonial history.  
The capacity to project and foist decisive stakes on African states and institutions is no longer only 
peculiar to western actors, even though they are credited with historically pioneering the phenomenon. 
Since the post-Cold War era, state-owned and private mining corporations from many Eastern 
countries (China, India, Malaysia, etc) and other emerging economies have rapidly acquired vast 
stakes and also become important stakeholders in African economies, states and societies in such a 
way that no African-owned agencies could operate in the home turf of these emerging economies. In 
its most blatant forms, the predatory business corporations of China and other emerging non-Western 
economies have acquired harmful stakes in many African economies through a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ with unaccountable African governing elites, a process akin to the ways by which 
western imperialism has been sustained in the African post-colonial states. In his well-researched 
report titled The Anatomy of the Resource Curse: Predatory Investment in Africa’s Extractive 
Industries, Mailey (2015) has examined the complex subversive linkages between predatory foreign 
businesses (mostly from the emerging Eastern economies) and the African ruling elites in relatively 
chaotic resource-rich fragile states. The author for instance provides a detailed anatomy of the dodgy 
business practices of one group of investors that has been particularly active on the continent since the 
early 2000s: a Hong Kong-based consortium known as the 88 Queensway Group. Cultivating 
relationships with high-level government officials in politically isolated resource-rich states through 
infusions of cash, promises of billions of dollars in infrastructural development (which they hardly 
deliver), and support for the security sector, Queensway has been able to gain access to major oil and 
mining concessions across Africa with massive operations in at least nine countries, including Angola, 
Guinea, Madagascar, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Mailey, 2015, p. 1). 
Decisive expatriate stakeholding from both the West and East has also become significantly 
discernible in African regional institutions such as the AU, IGAD, NEPAD, ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, 
and so forth. The new $200 million ultra-modern headquarters complex of the African Union was 
constructed and delivered as a special gift to Africa by the government of the Peoples’ Republic of 
China, and the Chinese in turn occupy a number of strategic floors in the skyrise building as partners 
and stakeholders of the ‘African renaissance.’ This is a feat that no African states or agencies is 
capable of replicating in Jakarta for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three 
(China, Japan and South Korea) and it is inconceivable that Africa agencies could be recognised as 
expatriate stakeholders in ASEAN in a similar manner that China is recognised in the AU.  
Virtually all the important conflict and development intervention projects in Africa implemented 
by states and non-state actors have foreign donors and stakeholders. With some rare exceptions, 
peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in contemporary Africa have become almost 
inconceivable without some form of pivotal expatriate funding, technical assistance and overall 
stakeholding.  Most successful regional policy think tanks and national NGOs in Africa are not only 
funded by foreign donors (mostly western agencies) but also have the latter enlisted as key 
stakeholders. How many quangos in the west are funded by African donors or have the latter as part 
of their stakeholders? 
There may be practically nothing wrong with foreign investors, states, donors and regional 
agencies acquiring diverse material and non-material stakes in foreign lands. But foreign stakeholding 
in a weak state almost always comes at a formidable price – deepening vulnerability in institutional, 
transactional and managerial terms – especially if the weak state is not astute in domestic regulation, 
and economic and cultural diplomacy as is often the case. It is against this backdrop of deepening 
vulnerability that we can understand the lamentation in the Report of the Africa Progress Panel 
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chaired for former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that ‘tax evasion, secret mining deals and 
financial transfers through grossly inflated pricing are depriving Africa of the benefits of its resources 
boom; mining firms operating in many African countries use these mechanisms to shift profits to 
lower tax jurisdictions, costing Africa $38 billion a year. … Africa loses more money through these 
loopholes than it gets in aids and foreign direct investments’ (BBC News, 2013). The Report gave the 
example of the Democratic Republic of Congo where between 2010 and 2012 five under-priced 
mining concessions were sold in ‘highly opaque and secretive deals,’ costing the country about $1.3 
billion in revenues; and Zambia where between 2005 and 2009, 500,000 copper mine workers were 
paying a higher rate of tax than major multinational mining firms. Annan aptly recognized that Africa 
cannot fight these ‘illicit outflows’ alone, stressing that ‘the tax evasion, avoidance, secret bank 
accounts are problems for the world and as such Africa needs to work together with the richer nations, 
particularly the G8 … to ensure we have a multilateral solution to the crisis’ (BBC News, 2013). 
The findings of The Africa Progress Panel and Annan’s reflection on the international complexity 
of the problem of tax avoidance and transfer pricing by mining companies operating in weak African 
states buttress the point about the deepening vulnerability of weak states inundated with foreign 
stakeholding in their economies even in times of extractive resource boom. Furthermore, it brings to 
the fore the need to break away from the state-centric supposition by mainstream political economy 
analysts that resource curse essentially revolves around the dysfunctionality of the state and 
malpractices by its officials. Even though a largely weak state’s phenomenon, the issue of tax 
avoidance and evasion by mining multinational companies on the continent is not just a problem that 
Africa can simply solve by states and state officials stopping the ‘harmful stuffs’ they do and doing 
the ‘good’ they ought to do. To a lesser extent, tax avoidance by operating transnational companies 
and wealthy tycoons who often exploit loopholes in tax laws to shift profits to offshore subsidies and 
bank accounts in tax havens (countries with low or lax taxation) is also a problem that affects and 
exercises the governments of some of the developed countries like UK, US, France, and Germany. It 
is also in this context that proponents of ‘good [democratic] governance’ – as important and well-
meaning as the proposal could be – tend to be exaggerating their case. In its first anti-corruption 
report, the EU Commission remarks that ‘the extent of corruption in Europe is ‘breath-taking’ and it 
costs the EU economy at least 120 billion Euros annually’ (BBC News 2014). Clearly, to a lesser 
extent, corruption and bad governance are also a problem in the EU zone. Of course, good 
governance, especially the quality of resource governance can make a difference in some countries as 
the examples of Botswana and Chile have demonstrated (Basedau & Lay, 2009, p. 760). However, as 
Collier (2008, p. 65) has persuasively argued: 
 
Excellent governance and economic policies can help the growth process, but there is a ceiling to 
feasible growth rate at around 10%: economies just cannot grow much faster than this no matter what 
governments do. … Good governance and policies help a country to realise its opportunities, but they 
cannot generate opportunities where none exist, and they cannot defy gravity. Even the best 
governance and policies are not going to turn Malawi into a rich country – it just does not have the 
opportunities under the prevailing international trade and economic conditions (emphasis in italics 
mine). … By contrast, terrible governance and policies can destroy an economy with alarming speed. 
 
In spite of its promise, the macro-economic limitations of good governance cannot be over-
emphasized. Bad governance, on the other hand, is catastrophic.  
Natural resource rents in Africa 
Abundant natural resources generally generate surplus rent. In his pioneering study on the Middle-
Eastern oil-rich states, Beblawi defines rents as “exports earned or income derived from a gift of 
nature” (Beblawi, 1987, p. 85). Adopting a more classical economistic approach, Dunning (2008, p. 3) 
defines rents as a super-normal level of profit associated with economic return to natural resource 
extraction that exceeds production and transport costs and some ‘normal’ return to capital. Deeper 
reflections on the present empirical dynamics on rent necessitate a more expanded definition. Rents 
are extraordinary profits and other related revenues derived from the development, extraction and sale 
of natural resources, under the direct control of the state and mining companies. The natural resource-
rich states defined as rentier are usually those of developing countries whose economies are 
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dominated by an export-oriented extractive resource sector, in most cases, oil and gas and solid 
minerals.  
Most rentier theorists only associate rents with the state or government based on the etymological 
origin of the term which has to do with the money a tenant pays to a landlord for the contractual use 
or lease of his property. In the case of natural resources, the state in whose territorial jurisdiction a 
particular resource is extracted is the figurative landlord. In the case of most resource-rich African 
states, the state is an irresponsible and lazy landlord that hardly makes any significant investment in 
developing its natural property (the strategic resource). Similarly, the state seldom invests in 
developing its capacity to regulate the resource exploitation by operating companies and other 
agencies. Most dismally, the state scarcely invests in expanding and strengthening its institutional and 
technical capacity to effectively manage and account for the revenues accruing to its coffers as natural 
resource rent.  Resulting from the state’s negligence in investing in its overall natural resource 
ownership capacity is that the state is easily out-smarted, short-changed and taken advantage of by the 
more experienced natural resource mining companies that are usually of expatriate origin. In addition 
to retaining a significantly high level of profit margin, mining companies frequently take advantage of 
the weak institutional and regulatory capacity of the weak resource-rich states to further leverage their 
financial buoyancy. Furthermore, most expatriate mining companies operating in Africa make huge 
gains by relatively underpaying labour, and also by minimizing corporate environmental and social 
responsibilities. In fact, besides making extraordinary profits, some of the mining companies in Africa 
such as Shell Petroleum in Nigeria and Mopani Copper Mines (a subsidiary of the Swiss multinational 
Glencore) in Zambia are so politically powerful in relation to the state that they are no longer a typical 
tenant of the state but a de facto co-landlord with the state. In the day-to-day discourses, attitudes and 
orientation of members of the host communities where some of the mining companies operate, the 
perception that the powerful mining companies are a de facto co-landlord and apparently a ‘shadow-
state’ figure à la Reno (1998) is palpably strong. Informally, many government officials would 
readily admit and affirm this popular discourse in countries like Nigeria, Angola, Zambia and DRC 
(Omeje, 2006, 2008; Mailey, 2015). It is because of this practical anomaly regarding the 
institutionality of the big mining companies in Africa and the fabulous surplus wealth they control  
that I have expanded the meaning of rents to include the vast reservoir of rentier resources in the 
hands of the mining industry. Most significantly, the vast rentier surplus controlled by the extractive 
companies operating in the resource-rich developing countries, which are usually expatriate 
companies have far-reaching implications for armed conflict.  
Another consequence of the state’s gross under-investment in its natural resource ownership and 
revenue management capacity is that too often a significant but usually unknown amount of rentier 
revenues are haemorrhaged from the state’s fiscal coffers by the governing elites, sometimes in 
connivance with the mining industry and the highly patronage-driven private business sector. Large 
amounts of the state’s rentier resources are frequently siphoned throw well-known devices like under-
reporting of revenue receipts, hyper-inflation of government contracts, import-related money 
laundering, and barefaced looting of slush funds (e.g. in countries like Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea and Angola) (Moyo, 2009; Ross, 2012). 
Many experts argue that rentier states generally lacks a productive outlook in the sense that their 
revenues do not depend on the growth of the domestic economy, coupled with the observation that the 
rent-yielding extractive sector is susceptible to the infamous Dutch disease (Dunning, 2008; Magrin & 
Vliet, 2009). This type of inverse correlation hypothesised between natural resource-driven rentier 
revenues and manufacturing exports believed to be the trigger of the Dutch disease cannot be 
extended to developing economies without considerable caution. Clearly, the narrative seemed 
discernible in the Netherland’s economy of the 1960s, a developed capitalist economy where the 
revenue influx from the discovery of natural gas made the Dutch Guilder to rise in value, thereby 
producing a negative knock-on effect on manufactured commodity exports (Ismail, 2010). Among the 
developing countries of Africa, the manifestation of the Dutch disease is comparatively different 
because most natural resource-rich states like Nigeria, Gabon, DRC, and Angola do not have an 
export-based manufacturing sector, not least at the stage when their economies became manifestly 
rentierized. As such, a windfall in revenue receipts from primary commodity exports like oil and solid 
minerals does not necessarily destroy local manufacturing or its export competitiveness (which hardly 
exists). But it potentially destroys other sectors like agricultural and forestry production, which was 
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for instance the case with the economies of Gabon, Congo and Sudan where the commercial 
production and export of oil practically destroyed all the robust agro-forestry exports on which their 
economies were previously based. Besides the rentier effect, African cash crop exporting economies 
were also badly affected by a convergence of the Dutch disease in the 1970s and the subsequent crash 
in the prices of primary agricultural commodities in the world market in the 1980s (Ademola, 2012). 
In fact, a number of scholars have extended the concept of rent to analyse many African states whose 
economies are dependent on primary agricultural commodities (e.g. tea, coffee, cocoa, cotton, etc) as 
a result of the boom and bust cycle of these commodities in the world market and the tendency of 
prebendal waste and aggrandisement among the state governing elites by courtesy of the commodity 
revenue windfall – a behavioural pattern associated with the typical rentier states.   
Rentier states, especially (but not exclusively) those marked by weak low income economies are 
typically associated with a convoluted paradigm of behaviour and political culture linked to extreme 
levels of patronage, mediocrity, prebendal accumulation and institutional deformity that dialectically 
impede and even sometimes reverse development. Beblawi was the first proponent to use the term 
‘rentier behaviour’ or ‘rentier mentality’ to describe the paradigm, which he argued was acquiring an 
inexorable trans-national, pan-regional current in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s and infecting both oil 
and (to a lesser extent) non-oil states alike because of the tendency for guest workers from the poorer 
non-oil states to gravitate to the oil states for rentier income and to in turn  remit their surplus savings 
back home for family support and investments (Beblawi, 1987). Through this income transfer process, 
the guest workers make substantial contributions to economic growth in their home countries. 
Consequently, many state-led and voluntary sector projects in the non-oil Arab states depend on 
government grants and charity support from the oil-rich Arab states based on pan-Arab religious, 
political and cultural obligations. Beblawi described the entire process of structural dependency of the 
non-oil Arab states on their oil-rich counterparts as the ‘osmotic effects’ of oil rents. At its worst, 
institutionalised rentier behaviour transverses the state, economy and society, largely contributing to a 
perverse national culture. Ostensibly, the most virulent expressions of encompassing rentier behaviour 
in Africa would be the cases of DRC, Nigeria and Angola where the dominant discursive language, 
political orientation and accumulation patterns and devices across the state, economy and society are 
extraordinarily rentier (Omeje, 2006; Goldthau & Martin eds., 2010; Global Witness, 2012). Even the 
day-to-day media headlines, debates and popular stories in the encompassingly rentierized African 
states are awash with issues of accumulation by fronting, blackmail, deception, dispossession, 
kidnapping, witchcraft and abracadabra - interfacing structure of the state, economy and society. 
Further on its downside effects, rentierism (i.e. the condition or syndrome of rent dependency) can 
destroy cottage industries and perhaps can partly prevent largescale manufacturing from taking off 
subject to other crucial factors like availability of relevant cost-effective technology, a critical mass of 
technically skilled manpower and profitable local and export markets.  
Rentier stakes and stakeholders: towards a new conceptual explanation 
Natural resource rents dialectically generate stakes and stakeholders or put differently, stakes and 
stakeholders coalesce around resource rents. The concept of stakes and stakeholders were first 
developed and popularised in the profit-oriented business management field from where they 
gradually made an inroad into the social sciences and public policy analysis. In the mainstream 
business management conception, stakes are regarded as ‘shares’ and ‘interests’ which individuals 
and groups hold in a business corporation (usually by way of capital investment, credits and loans, 
occupational engagement, customer service, etc). By corollary, stakeholders are those who hold stakes 
in a business, a rather simplistic way of defining the concept. The original definition of stakeholder by 
Freeman who is popularly credited with pioneering stakeholder analysis in business studies conceives 
it as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s 
objectives’ (Freeman, 1984:46). Those that ‘affect’ or are ‘affected’ by the goals and actions of an 
organisation are sometimes referred to as active and passive stakeholders in the natural resource 
stakeholder literature (Reed et al, 2009). The typical stakeholders in a business are those who have 
something to gain or loss as a result of the corporation’s activities and the list include the employees, 
shareholders, management, creditors, consumers, suppliers, government, competitors, communities, 
employees, and trade unions (Fremond, 2000; Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2005). There are a wide range 
of other definitions of stakeholder which tend to build on Freeman’s seminal study and also on the 
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growing recognition of the interactive relationships between business corporations and the societies 
where they operate.  
 In the largely non-profit oriented social and policy ‘science’ where stakeholder analysis has 
been progressively popularised since the 1990s, the definition of stakeholder is not fundamentally 
different from the typical business school definition. Many social policy experts define the concept 
from the standpoint of normative theory as representing the diverse persons, groups, organisations and 
communities that must be taken into account (if possible consulted and involved) by leaders and 
managers in their day-to-day decision making, and policy formulation and implementation (Bryson, 
2004; Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2005).  A World Bank pilot study group defines a stakeholder from a 
more pragmatic rational actor theoretical perspective as ‘any entity with a declared or conceivable 
interest or stake in a policy concern’ (World Bank, n.d.). In their various stakeholder analyses, both 
business and social policy experts have come up with various classifications of stakeholders, such as 
active and passive/dormant stakeholders, primary and secondary stakeholders, key/major and minor 
stakeholders, etc. Stakeholder analysis has become quite popular in contemporary policy, 
development, security, conflict and governance studies. Virtually every social issue today (e.g. 
peacebuilding, terrorism, climate change, development provisioning, female genital mutilation and 
violence against vulnerable girls and women, etc) is believed to have multiple stakeholders whose 
opinions and some form of participation are considered important for the viability of any policy or 
programme intervention. Conventional stakeholder analysis is a way of understanding a system 
through its stakeholders by looking at their interests, objectives, relative power/influence and 
relationships (ICRA, 1997). 
Extrapolating from the foregoing conceptions to explain the vicissitudes of events, phenomena and 
processes in the natural resource-rich African states, one can theorize about the nature of rentier 
stakes and stakeholders, as well as the social milieu in which rentier activities take place. Rentier 
stakes can be defined as the interests that different individuals, groups, classes, firms and other social 
agencies hold, claim and pursue within a rentier state. These interests are principally materialistic and 
pecuniary interests – financial resources, mining and mining resource-related positions and 
appointments; mining rights, concessions and contracts; compensation and redress against violations 
related to mining activities; rewards, perks and privileges associated with natural resource 
endowments and revenues, and so forth. The various interest-driven social agents spanning the entire 
spectrum of rentier resource chain can be labelled stakeholders and they represent diverse interests 
both within and outside a given state system. The stakeholders therefore include both domestic and 
external actors. From an economics perspective, the supply of all types of finite resources is relatively 
limited and scarce in relation to demand. Hence, rentier resources, as abundant as they are in the 
resource-rich states, are still relatively scarce in relation to demand. Competition amongst 
stakeholders therefore becomes inevitable, which makes the relative power and influence wielded by 
stakeholders at any given conjuncture important and sometimes decisive.  
From a post-modernist perspective, power is ubiquitous, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional; it is 
also relational and situational. Above all, power is essentially dialectical and political; politics itself 
being a correspondingly multi-faceted activity in which diverse social agents strive to project and 
advance their interests, agendas and discursive representations at varied levels and spheres of human 
association and endeavour. Hence, every stakeholder is capable of wielding some measure of power 
but it is certainly not all stakeholders that are capable of wielding the measure of power that can yield 
the outcomes they desire or expect in every circumstance.  Similarly, it is not in all circumstances that 
the neo-realist preferred instrument of hard power (coercive military force) confers decisive 
advantage to a conceivably more powerful stakeholder or determines rentier outcomes. Various 
stakeholders deploy a nexus of hard and soft power in different circumstances to maximise their 
competitive advantages and prospectively influence rentier outcomes. Occasionally, a threat of or 
resort to armed violence by stakeholder(s) occurs, and this is practically an extension of rentier 
politics. Of course, armed violence is a ubiquitous phenomenon in many rentier and non-rentier states 
and thus it is not every threat or use of armed violence that is tantamount to an extension of rentier 
politics.  
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Stakeholder politics and accumulation in the rentier state 
Consequential stakes and stakeholders operate within a metaphorical space which can be regarded as 
the rentier space. The ‘rentier space’ is a metaphoric platform that subsumes and upholds the diverse 
activities related to the acquisition and control of rentier resources in a state, including the disposition, 
appropriation and utilization of any accruable funds, perquisites, dividends and opportunities (Omeje, 
2008). Any rentier stakes and stakeholders operating outside the rentier space can at best be 
embryonic or putative. Aspirational stakes can be conceived by different actors both within and 
outside the rentier space, but consequential stakes can only be advanced within the rentier space 
where aspirational stakes have a chance of being converted into reckonable concrete stakes.  
 
 
 
In the typical African rentier states as depicted in Figure 1 above, the principal hubs where 
aspirational stakes could be converted into concrete stakes are those operated by the relevant state 
institutions (e.g. the ministry of petroleum resources) and the mining industry – the rentier landlord 
and co-landlord as it were. These could be labelled the macro-conversion hubs. The mining industry is 
an amalgam of the state-owned mining corporations, TNCs (some of which operate diverse kinds of 
partnership ventures with the state) and the indigenous private sector (some of which have joint 
partnerships with the TNCs or are fronted by the latter). Consequently, the mining industry may 
represent diverse sub-sectoral stakes or interests. For instance, in a typical oil-rich rentier economy 
the sub-sectoral stakes might include oil exploration, production, shipping and export, refining and 
processing, marketing and distribution, servicing and maintenance, etc (Solomon, 2011). As such, the 
mining industry does not necessarily represent a monolithic interest and, similarly, the interests of the 
industry are not invariably consistent with the interests of the state and its top officials. However, 
because of the disproportionate and sometimes vulnerable reliance of the rentier state on rentier 
revenues, there exists a predictably high level of companionability and tolerance (call it a marriage of 
convenience) between the mining rent-dependent state and the mining industry. The state desperately 
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needs a regular inflow of revenues from the mining rents to sustain the domestic patronage 
extravaganza and consumerist economy while the mining sector requires the goodwill of the state to 
retain mining concessions and, to a lesser extent, guarantee security around the mining areas 
(Apkomera, 2015). Similarly, the mining sector may require the goodwill of the state or, as is often 
the case, simply take advantage of its weak institutionality to maximize operational profits by local 
exploitation of labour, minimal corporate environmental/social responsibility, and a host of other 
unwholesome contrivances (Deibert, 2013).  
Besides the macro-conversion hubs operated by the state and mining sector, there may similarly 
exists within the rentier space some micro-conversion hubs at the level of the (un)civil and grassroots 
society stakeholders, however these subservient micro-hubs rarely have an independent life of their 
own as they, by and large, derive their rentier current from their connection with or predation of the 
macro-hubs. An example of a micro-conversion hub operation is the occasional money some mining 
companies pay out to local community chiefs as informal royalty and compensation for mining land 
expropriation and destruction of unharvested farm crops and economic trees (Omeje, 2013). Such an 
occasional doling out of funds to local community chiefs or community leaders have almost 
invariably triggered a flurry of disbursement claims from many families and community members, 
allegations of fund embezzlement by the chiefs which too often results in varying levels of implosive 
conflict (Okonta & Douglas, 2003; Deibert, 2013). 
The nature and configuration of the rentier space is context-specific and dynamic, but given the 
decisiveness of rentier revenues in a rentier economy it is evident that the state and mining industry 
are the dominant stakeholders. From a neo-Weberian perspective, an important distinction must be 
made between the territorial state and the institutional state. The territorial state is the state defined 
from the more legalistic Westphalian perspective in which a state is characterised by the existence of: 
(a) a defined territory and population; (b) a standing army or security forces; (c) a central government 
that has a monopoly of the legitimate use of coercive force within the territory, and (d) recognition of 
the state and its government by other states among the comity of states (juridical sovereignty). Given 
the fact that many states in Africa and other developing regions vitiate from the Westphalian 
benchmark, a number of adjectival qualifiers have been adopted in defining and theorising the African 
state, and the state in developing regions (e.g. weak state, fragile state, neopatrimonial state, rentier 
state, and so forth). However, these adjectival qualifications are essentially academic because one 
cannot empirically sustain the argument that all the states in Europe (including struggling Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Greece) are stronger than all the states in Africa in terms of 
institutional, security and economic viability.  Be that as it may, the institutional state can be loosely 
defined as the executive apparatus of government, and the gamut of formal and informal institutions 
and agencies that are linked to the dominance of hegemonic power at any given time. In most 
territorial rentier states, the institutional rentier state stands out either in isolation or in association 
with the mining industry (or sometimes with  just a section of the industry such as the leading MNCs) 
as the ‘hegemonic stakeholder.’ This by no means implies that the institutional rentier state itself is a 
coherent force. Too often, and depending on the historical and political struggles that have 
characterised the evolution of the state, the institutional rentier state can be a fragile coalition of social 
agencies purportedly representing salient (sub)ethnic, (sub)provincial, sectarian, cultural, business and 
other allied interests. Because the institutional state is usually structured into central and subnational 
administrative levels, stakeholders within the institutional state are correspondingly drawn from 
various levels that by no means wield equal measure of power and influence. Political power in 
general is fluid, likewise the significance of agencies that wield power in relation to others at different 
times, be they individual stakeholders or sub-national states and institutions.  
Beyond the dominant and hegemonic stakeholders, there is a myriad of subordinate or secondary 
stakeholders which operate from the civil society, grassroots communities and the larger political 
space. Some of them include specific opposition parties, NGOs, professional bodies, women’s groups, 
cultural associations, community vigilantes, civil militia groups, regional and international 
organisations, etc. What distinguishes the secondary stakeholders from many other similar 
organisations and agencies is the issue of group perception that they (or in some cases the group they 
are acting on their behalf) have a stake in the ‘collective rentier resources’ and more importantly, the 
articulation of some kind of strategies to press for the perceived claim or entitlement. In fact, the 
combination of perception and strategising for rentier stakes is what ultimately gives rise to the 
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politics of stakeholderisation. Depending on their overall strategies and the intensity and impact of 
their activism, some secondary stakeholders can be reckoned as more active and consequential than 
others. A prolonged lack of consequential strategy and activism can render a stakeholder dormant or 
completed irrelevant. A stakeholder can also quietly give up its entitlement claim/pursuit or be forced 
by an overwhelming circumstance to do so, a tendency that can be described as de-stakeholderisation. 
In practical terms, the relative fluidity of the rentier space which is partly explained by the 
preponderant self-serving tendency of rentier politics, entails a great measure of permeability between 
one category or segment of stakeholding and another. Hence, it is possible for an individual actor to 
start off as a civil society-based secondary stakeholder and over time advance to become a mining 
industry-based dominant stakeholder and ultimately an institutional state-based hegemonic 
stakeholder. A somewhat reverse trend can also be discerned in many African countries but perhaps to 
a lesser extent. The rentier state executive occasionally uses direct appointment of vocal opposition 
figures to top government positions as a soft means to build elite consensus and silence opposition. 
This Machiavellian tactic was ingeniously perfected by ex-President Mobutu Sese Seko in former 
Zaire and ex-President Ibrahim Babangida in Nigeria during the hey-days of pro-democracy campaign 
in Africa in the 1980 and 1990s. Since assuming the reins of power in Cameroon in 1982, President 
Paul Biya has continued to rely on this method to ‘buy out’ his political opponents some of whom 
were to be later dismissed and incarcerated by his government under allegations of corruption. Rentier 
stakes rise, mutate, become [partially] achieved and fall over time, and so do the stakeholders that 
champion them.  
 
Conclusion: proposing a transition from the rentier state to a transformative state 
Generally, natural resources rents produce and attract a multiplicity of competitive stakeholders, both 
domestic and external, in the resource-rich states, making a stakeholder analytical framework to the 
understanding of the patterns and dynamics of rentier accumulation imperative. The competition and 
jostling of stakeholders for access to, and appropriation of, rentier resources is too often an 
antagonistic process in many emerging economies that have consequences and implications for 
violent conflict. Content-specific nuances and variations in accumulation processes and the correlated 
conflicts abound, which can be accounted for using empirical case studies but this does not however 
occlude the prevalence of some general patterns in the politics of stakeholder accumulation. The latter 
clearly calls for bolder explanatory paradigms and meta-narratives. 
It is pertinent to emphasise that stakeholder relations are not only adversarial and conflictual as 
seems to be the case in many rentier states but could also be relations of cooperation, co-governance 
and development – what one could call a transformative state model. The latter requires a [conflict] 
transformation, good governance and development-driven agenda. A transformative state model of 
stakeholder relations in natural resource governance is one that is based on the principles of 
transparency, democratic accountability, devolution, multi-stakeholder participation and sustainability 
throughout the natural resource value chain and regulated by an effective constitutional order. The 
proposed framework involves the steps from the extraction of natural resources, to their processing 
and sale, all the way through to the ultimate use of the revenues, which if well managed, will help in 
ensuring that, as opposed to breeding conflicts, natural resource wealth transforms into citizens’ 
wellbeing (cf. Natural Resource Governance Institute, n.d.; Collier, 2008). To be most effective, the 
state has to play more of a regulatory, managerial, supervisory and service-delivery function as 
opposed to being an instrument for self-serving rentier accumulation. Changing the outlook and role 
of the state and empowering it to perform decisive regulatory and service delivery functions is a major 
step towards deconstructing the obnoxious African rentier states and transforming them into more 
purposeful and functional development-driven states. Botswana probably presents one of the closest 
approximations of a transformative state model of natural resource governance in Africa, and one that 
calls for a focused empirical study with a view to exploring how the positive lessons could help to 
influence natural resource governance policies and practices in some of the most challenged 
economies. It is clearly in a transformative state model of stakeholder politics in natural resource 
governance that lies the way out of the resource curse trap. 
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